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Abstract. Within appearing the global financial crisis, standard macroeconomic 
approaches, in particular, monetary policies conducted prior to global recession have 
become targets of harsh criticism because of their weakness against these imbalances. The 
recession was a consequence of multiple factors including excessive private and public 
debt, poor financial surveillance and incapability of institutional structure to cope with 
potential risk sources. However, due to the nature of the recession, monetary authorities 
have been accused much more because of uncertainties relating to their mandates, weakness 
of their precautionary signaling and also time-inconsistency problems of policy 
transmission channels.In addition, because of limited effects of both conventional and 
unconventional measures, the urgent need to revise mandates of monetary authorities and 
totally the nature of monetary policy is the topic attracting significant attention. In this 
context, reassessment of cardinalshifting in monetary policies and implementation of 
fundamental realignments to the conventional central banking conception can be noted as 
challenges of post-crisis period.  
Keywords. Monetary policy, Central banking, Financial crisis, Unconventional measures, 
Financial stability. 
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1. Introduction 
he world is currently in the fragile recovery process after struggling with 
global crisis, which according to some economists, the worst economic 
crisis since the Great Depression. Within rapid expansion of globalization, 
high development levels in global economy, a radical decrease in unemployment 
levels in advanced and some emerging countries put the possibility of economic 
downturn under doubt. Because of these reasons, the global economic crisis that 
began in 2008 was largely unexpected and unforeseen for most scholars. Just 
before the crisis, the IMF in its bi-annual World Economic Outlook announced that 
risks to the global economy had become extremely low, given that capital inflows 
pushed up borrowing and asset prices, while reducing spreads on risky assets. 
Within analyzing ultimate sources of sudden of the crisis, it becomes obvious 
that in order to lower the likelihood of future financial collapses, prudent economic 
policies as well as an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework for financial 
institutions are required. Global financial-economic crisis and its results make 
rethinking of macroeconomic policy framework necessity. (Blanchard et. al., 2010) 
Firstly, the Lehman crisis depicted limitations of monetary policy and how 
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policymakers miscalculated the risks originating from financial system. Secondly, 
Eurozone crisis made it compulsory to revise the issues regarding with currency 
unions and monetary integration processes. Thirdly, poor regulatory and 
supervisory framework which contributed to high leverage and large maturity 
mismatch among financial system participants and institutions rather than 
countering externalities existing in the system, resulted with widespread 
counterparty mistrust, liquidity shortages, and contagion to other markets. This fact 
also depicts inadequacy of the financial system and key players’ functionalities to 
the current financial architecture.  
One of the key debates over rethinking macroeconomic policies closely relates 
to monetary policies and revising mandates of the authorities which are charged to 
implement these policies. Before the crisis economists and central bankers were in 
a celebratory mode, with talk about the ―Great Moderation‖ and praise for 
advances in monetary economics that had helped stabilize the economy. 
(Goodfriend, 2007) However with the abrupt of the economic imbalances and 
monetary authorities’ inadequacy to diminish their noxious effects on the economy, 
it became urgent demand for policymakers to realign monetary policy. Monetary 
authorities throughout the world preferred to respond to this demand by a mix of 
policy packages which encapsulated both cutting interest rates to historically low 
levels and embarking on a series of unconventional policy actions. (Peersman, 
2011) The experience of central banks during the crisis reveals that these policies 
resulted changes in the composition of their balance sheets, measures that expand 
the size of the balance sheet or actions that try to guide longer term interest rate 
expectations.  
It is not secret that many scholars consider that incumbent processes in the 
global economy relates to cyclical and structural transformation. Low interest rates 
which prevailed in the years prior to the global crisis are accepted as a key cyclical 
factor. According to Bernanke (2005), who called it ―global saving glut‖, main 
reasons under low interest rates are both expansionary monetary policy reflected in 
short-term policy interest rates and capital inflows from emerging markets to 
developed countries that affected long-term interest. Prior to and after the crisis, the 
role and policy instruments that central banks should use in order to realize its 
targets are very debatable. For much of the period since 2008, many economies, 
including the US, the UK, Switzerland, Eurozone, and Japan, relied on the zero 
lower bound in order to achieve full employment, to target inflation and also to 
mitigate negative impacts of depressed aggregate demand and persistent gaps 
between output and potential. However these policies have not been fully 
successful in terms of achieving their targets while led to emerging vulnerabilities 
in financial markets. In the light of the crisis, it can be concluded that targeting of 
monetary policy should be directed not only to preserve price stability, but also 
financial stability. Moreover, creating reliable and effective macro-prudential 
policy framework also turned into key macro-level policy instrument which can 
ensure financial stability. (Smets, 2013) 
The global crisis reflected excessive risk-taking and high leverage on the part of 
economic agents and financial institutions. Hence, to reduce the probability of 
another financial collapse, it is necessary to learn from experience by identifying 
the ultimate sources of the incentives that led to the crisis. (Sanchez, 2011) Based 
on this view, in the article it is tried to analyze briefly incumbent approaches to 
monetary policy which have been accepted as major sources of appearing the last 
crisis and assessing emerging paradigms in this field. 
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2. Cardinal Realignments in Central Banking 
The post-crisis challenges of macroeconomic mainstream make central banks to 
shoulder the greater part of the burden of post-crisis adjustment. They are blamed 
as sinners of ignoring of global imbalances’ emerging and speculative actions in 
financial markets. Therefore, the nature of monetary policies ought to be 
implemented by central banks as a response to economic fluctuations exposed to 
substantial controversial discussions. Standard new-Keynesian models (Goodfriend 
& King, 1997)
 
dictate monetary policies should be formulated in a countercyclical 
way. Furthermore, these ones appreciate inflation stabilization measures adequate 
for preserving the welfare-relevant output gap declaring that inflation-output trade-
off is not characteristic for monetary authorities in the process of realizing their 
targets like smoothing business cycles or enhancing long-term growth. This 
problem is entirely problematic in terms of incumbent global fragile growth 
patterns, liquidity trap threats and deflation pressures confronted by central banks. 
This led significant attention to the concept of ―divine coincidence‖ which implies 
the idea that central banks ought to pay much attention to the stabilization of 
inflation when they face with dilemma between it and output. Proponents of this 
view consider that policies to keep inflation under control would also useful to 
stabilize output at potential level. Moreover, in the case of a severe recession, 
monetary policy effectiveness may be limited due to impairment of the monetary 
transmission mechanism so that central banks may more than ever be ―pushing on 
a string‖. This reinforces the case for a conservative central bank that concerns 
itself only with inflation. (Rogoff, 1989) Moreover, in standard (conventional) 
monetary policy, capital markets are generally assumed to be efficient. Eventual 
financial imperfections and their potential macroeconomic effects are usually not 
taken into account when monetary policy is developed. (Weber, 2011) Temporary 
inefficiencies, such as asset price and housing price bubbles, are deemed events 
that monetary policy can do little to counteract. However, the crisis has caused a 
paradigm shift regarding the role of monetary policy in avoiding bubbles. Thus, 
monetary policy should avoid cheap credit if it enhances the artificial increase of 
prices for certain categories of assets. (Stark, 2010) Specifically, monetary policy 
should seek monetary equilibrium that does neither inhibit economic activity, nor 
potentiate inflation and artificially rising asset prices. 
However, the recent global financial crisis made it urgent for economists to 
revise these approaches and confess the solution to get rid of current situation can 
be found beyond the scope of standard accounts of monetary policy theory.  Firstly, 
relating to new-Keynesian approach, major central banks’ attitudes (reducing 
interest rates to historical low levels, massive using of unconventional measures 
and etc.) towards economic imbalances, indicate that stabilizing inflation alone 
cannot be accepted sufficient to fulfill their targets. These policies were formulated 
targeting higher growth and inflation by lowering interest rates, prompting 
borrowing and expenditure, thus revitalizing economic activity. On the contrary, 
current global economic landscape is that households crippled by existing high 
levels of debt, low house prices, uncertain employment prospects and stagnant 
income are reducing, not increasing, borrowing. Secondly, the character of relation 
between financial sector and real economy has become more complicated.
 
In case 
of normal downturns, easy monetary policy does lead to a stronger recovery in the 
case of normal downturns. However, in downturns associated with a financial 
crisis, particularly in the light of the latest one, statistically significant recovery has 
not been observed. (Bech et. al., 2012) Because of inability of pre-crisis monetary 
measures and approaches, a number of unconventional ones were introduced which 
made it completely unfeasible to maintain existing approach to central banking. 
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Prior to the global crisis, there was a common belief that central banks should 
focus only on financial variables’ impact on inflation. Determined inflation 
targeting was considered enough in terms of provision macroeconomic stability. 
However these ideas are relied on the conclusions of the models which appreciated 
financial frictions as result of borrowers’ activities in credit markets. In these 
models (Gilchrist & Leahy, 2002; Iacoviello, 2005; Bernanke & Gertler, 2000) 
credit-supply effects originated by financial intermediates are ignored. However, 
the global crisis made it obvious that how changes in credit supplies can be 
significant during macroeconomic fluctuations. According to empirical 
investigations, loose credit conditions led to augmentation of business cycles 
before the crisis. On one side, tightening of credit conditions after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy contributed to drastic decrease in aggregate output in 2008-09 while on 
the other side, debt crises appeared in EU amplified credit crunch risk. All these 
imbalances made it necessity to revise influence of credit channel on monetary 
policy management. 
Degradation of monetary policy instruments effectiveness can be appreciated as 
a crucial interference of the financial crisis which makes it necessity revise central 
banking paradigms. Some authors reckon that it is the suitable time to transform 
from ―one policy, one tool‖ approach to the ―more targets, more tools‖ view. 
(Blanchard et. al., 2013) In other words, not only pursuing policies to provide price 
stability (regulating inflation target through policy rates), but also supporting 
financial stability should be among central banks’ targets. The outcomes of the 
crisis depicted that inflation or aggregate output stability is not sufficient to provide 
macroeconomic sustainability. Severity of the recession and limited effectiveness 
of policy instruments revealed shortcomings of financial market surveillance. In 
the early stages of the crisis, central banks responded imbalances by lowering 
interest rates to the zero bound levels drastically which deprived them from their 
major policy tool. From its initial period, the crisis indicated that classical multiple-
equilibrium framework which offered a rationale to provide banks with deposit 
insurance and access to lender of last resort, currently begun to be applied also 
wholesale funding and non-bank intermediaries. Practically, countries are exposed 
to liquidity problem more than financial intermediaries because of the dependence 
on future tax revenues which are difficult to insure. Thereby central banks ought to 
supply liquidity not only for banks or other types of financial players, but also for 
states. 
Based on Tinbergen rule which is often stated like ―for each policy objective, at 
least one policy instrument is needed‖, central banks’ stance during the last 
economic downturns is confusing. There are strict arguments which dictate that 
central banks have failed to detect the auspices of the crisis mainly because of their 
incapability to prevent these signs using their narrow ―price stability‖ target. In the 
light of this view, some consider that monetary policy should be directed toward 
price stability, which is a central bank’s best contribution not only to long-term 
economic growth, but also to financial stability. (Pally, 2011) Therefore, it is 
widely argued that the responsible for monetary policy should have a 
comprehensive and continuous overview of the macroeconomic conditions (the 
inflation rate, the production gap, the balance of payments, the public budget, the 
exchange rate, household debt, etc.). (Vale, 2014) Based on this overview, a central 
bank has the competency to takes its monetary policy decisions. This strategy 
requires (in addition to such a macroeconomic overview) flexibility (which can be 
obtained at the expense of transparency) and a discretionary approach to monetary 
policy. (Sauer, 2010) However, lack of central banks’ strict regulatory and 
supervisory tools to target credit and housing bubbles that weakened the financial 
system have raised suspicions related to revising monetary authorities’ mandate. 
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The experience indicates that discretionary approach can originate dynamic 
inconsistencies through damaging monetary authorities’ credibility and efficiency 
of policies targeting to control inflation and interest rates misalignments. This 
argument is also strongly correlated with the fact that the forecasting models of the 
monetary authorities used widely prior to crisis did not incorporate crucial aspects 
of the financial sectors. Therefore, a rule based policy can be more credible, 
because it is more transparent and easier to anticipate for the actors in the market in 
accordance with Kydland & Prescott’s (1977) famous ―rules rather than discretion‖ 
state.  
In the light of these shortcomings of central banks’ mandates, their approach to 
financial imbalances also cast significant attitude. This problem has become much 
more considerable particularly in the context of monetary authorities’ incapability 
to manage expectations and lagging processes in markets. Moreover, within 
introducing of concepts like rational expectations and time-inconsistency (Kydland 
& Prescott, 1977; Calvo, 1978; Barro & Gordon, 1983); the need to adjust 
monetary policy decisions to the conjectural realignments has become much more 
significant in terms of realizing long-run targets. Difference and incoherence 
between expectations and final outcomes of individuals and policymakers lead to 
failure of monetary policy strategies. In other words, without a commitment 
mechanism, monetary policy makers may find themselves unable to consistently 
follow an optimal plan over time; the optimal plan can be time-inconsistent and so 
will soon be abandoned. The notion of time-inconsistency has led to a number of 
important insights regarding central bank behavior-such as the importance of 
reputation and institutional design. In the phase of massive application of zero-
bound level policies, time-inconsistency problem has contributed to increasing 
discussions about the nature of monetary policies also. 
 
3. Central Banks’ Responses to the Crisis: Unconventional 
Monetary Policies 
In the current recovery processes in global economy, one of the issues which 
began to attract attention is wide spreading of mixture of unconventional monetary 
policies, fiscal consolidation & stimulation and macro-prudential policy tools in 
order to revive global demand. In particular, in the context of inadequacy of 
international financial institutions’ intervention to the economic downturns, central 
banks preferred to implement accommodative monetary policies through various 
policy frameworks. During the crisis and sluggish growth years after it, major 
central banks have embarked on unconventional policies, to bring the real interest 
rate down further and thereby generate new investment demand. However, 
efficiency of these policies is very debatable. Aiming to solve insufficiency of 
demand, using monetary policy to drive the real interest rate permanently to low or 
perhaps, even negative rates is certainly difficult and can create significant 
distortions in the economy as seen in the example of some Eurozone countries. 
Countries could in principle achieve negative real rates through low nominal rates 
and moderate inflation however these are not enough to eliminate the risk of facing 
an adverse feedback loop, in which depressed demand leads to lower inflation, 
lower inflation leads to higher real rates, and higher real rates lead in turn to even 
more depressed demand. In the recovery process, a main challenge for advanced 
economies is efforts to normalize monetary policy. While some of this expected 
normalization has already been priced in both long rates and exchange rates, it can 
be expected complex and sometimes disruptive capital movements across countries 
for some time to come.  In that environment, it can be predicted that emerging 
market economies with weak macro frameworks may be most affected. 
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The severity of depressions and conjectural realignments made central banks to 
refine their policy instruments and move from conventional monetary policy – 
reducing policy rates via open-market purchases of short-term government bonds – 
to a range of unconventional policies. Monetary authorities all over the world, 
including Fed, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan and other advanced central 
banks responded to crisis in its early stages through using their most powerful tool- 
interest rate channel. However, the experience of the crisis made it obvious that 
lower rates and increasing the supply of money can stabilize financial markets but 
are not sufficient enough to contribute a drastic boost to economic activity. In other 
words, in the light of absence demand, central banks failed to encourage new 
investment and recover economic activity through low interest rates. Lack of 
coordination in the policies of advanced economies’ central banks can also be 
assessed as a major risk source not for only these countries, but also for emerging 
market economies. Consequently, monetary policies implemented in various 
advanced economies are seemed cannot hurdle major difficulties that these 
economies confront. In addition, global contradiction of fiscal-monetary policies- 
in most countries these policies are not supported with each other which it makes 
recovery processes fragile and pull global economy to secular stagnation. 
Conventional approach toward monetary policy which implies that lower interest 
rates will encourage households and companies to consume and invest more, 
therefore will positively affect other macroeconomic imbalances like inflation and 
output imbalances has become much more unrealistic in the case of the last crisis. 
Exactly, these monetary approaches by central banks and their policies’ weakness 
to direct economic processes led to the emerging of phenomena which is generally 
known as Keynes’s hypothesis on liquidity trap. Indeed, Keynesian liquidity trap 
arises at the point where the demand function for money becomes infinitely elastic, 
which could happen at a non-zero interest rate. The current situation in which the 
nominal rate hits its zero lower bound, has come to be called a ―liquidity trap‖ 
(Krugman, 1998), although that terminology differs somewhat from Keynes’ 
original meaning. Central banks aim both to stabilize inflation around a low level 
and to keep output close to its potential level. But monetary policy operates under 
considerable and unavoidable uncertainties about the state of the economy and the 
size and lag of the economy’s response to monetary-policy actions. In the light of 
these uncertainties, conventional monetary policy measures implemented during 
prior to the crisis period, have been unable to provide sufficient stimulus to the 
economy and address recession and deflation once the zero lower bound for 
interest rates has been reached. However, these attempts are not enough to 
stimulate economic activity at the desired (and also predicted) level. As Blanchard 
(2013) mentioned, ―On the liquidity trap: we have discovered, unfortunately at 
great cost, that the zero lower bound can indeed be binding, and be binding for a 
long time—five years at this point…it remains a fact that compared to conventional 
policy, the effects of unconventional monetary policy are very limited and 
uncertain‖. When unconventional monetary policies started to be implemented, 
many analysts were worried that the expansion of the monetary base would trigger 
inflationary pressures and central banks would lose control over price stability. 
However the reverse happened and currently monetary authorities are under 
deflationary pressures rather than opposite. This situation can be explained in two 
interpretations: either potential output has decreased close to actual output and 
therefore influences inflation weakly; or because of cardinal changes in the relation 
between inflation and output, this situation is observed. 
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Graph 1. Evolution of key policy rates 
Source: Lenza, & Reichlin (2010). 
 
Unconventional monetary policies (UMP) comprise two types: (i) policies to 
restore market functioning and intermediation through targeted liquidity provision 
and private asset purchases; (ii) policies to stimulate economic activity at the zero 
lower bound relying on forward guidance and bond purchases. Unconventional 
measures implemented by monetary authorities was successful in terms of 
providing market functioning and intermediation early in the global financial crisis, 
in response to acute macroeconomic shocks. As an essential part of UMP, pursuing 
zero-level bound policies led to reducing long-term rates and some positive trends 
in economic activity while was not able to eliminate financial stability risks. Based 
on general equilibrium models (IMF’s GIMF and standard multi-country DSGE 
models), aggressive monetary accommodation (keeping interest rates low for an 
unusually long time) in the countries preferred to use UMP in response to negative 
shocks, give advantages for non-UMP countries. Extremely low interest rates 
together with bond purchases induced further capital outflows than would be 
warranted just by lower interest rates, due to portfolio rebalancing effects, with 
investors seeking to replace their government bond holding with equivalent bonds 
in non-UMP countries with higher returns not depending on cutting levels in rates. 
On the other hand, prolonged period of capital inflows and cheap foreign financing 
impose significant risks for ensuring financial stability. According to Rajan (2013), 
these risks are closely related to the factors like low underlying productivity 
growth, persistent high unemployment, the need for large supply-side adjustments, 
especially, unequal sector and regional distribution of the impacts on activity, the 
possibility that firms’ preferences to keep labor saving capital at very low rates and 
income effects that could rise relative to the substitution effect of low rates, 
possibly dampening downward pressure on savings. In this context, central banks 
have to cope various strains of the financial crisis through massive complementary 
policy packages like increasing liquidity provision to their banking systems 
elastically, accommodating banks’ increased demand for liquidity, starting to 
purchase medium and long-dated public sector securities, or securities guaranteed 
by governments, offering explicit verbal guidance on the evolution of policy in the 
future and etc. 
After emerging of the crisis, central banks in advanced countries started to 
implement MP-Plus policy packages in which the range of policy tools is very 
extensive. (IMF, 2013a) The most massively used tool among them is quantitative 
easing (QE) which involves direct purchases in government bond markets to 
reduce yield levels or term spreads when the policy rate is at or close to the lower 
bound. Considerations toward QE and its impact on monetary system are 
differential. It is appreciated as a policy approach with three features (i) explicit 
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targets for bank reserves; (ii) a conditional commitment to maintain high reserves 
levels into the future; and (iii) increased purchases of government bonds to 
facilitate the attainment of the target on bank reserves. (Ugai, 2006) According to 
some scholars, it is a mixture of bank reserves policy and quasi-debt management 
policy which involves a specific communication strategy about the future of 
banking and financial system. Spiegel (2001) assesses quantitative easing as a 
policy to reduce long term interest rates through the expansion of reserves. QE is 
also characterized as the purchase of public and private sector assets using central 
bank money which includes a combination of bank reserves, credit and quasi-debt 
management policies. (Benford et. al., 2009) Asset purchases can affect longer-run 
interest rates by lowering the expected path of short-term rates as well as by 
reducing the term premium of long-duration securities. 
 The second one is credit easing (CE), which took the form of central-bank 
purchases of private or semi-private assets – such as mortgage- and other asset-
backed securities, covered bonds, corporate bonds, real-estate trust funds, and even 
equities via exchange-traded funds. The aim was to reduce private credit spreads 
(the difference between yields on private assets and those on government bonds of 
similar maturity) and to boost, directly and indirectly, the price of other risky assets 
such as equities and real estate. Bernanke (2009) describes credit easing, in the 
model of U.S. monetary system, as the range of lending programs and securities 
purchases which implies extension of credit to a wide range of private sector 
entities, bank and non-banks, as well as purchases of Treasury and government-
sponsored enterprise debt. Central banks choose credit easing policies mainly 
targeting to improve financing conditions for the non-financial private sector. The 
scope and range of measures generally are formulated in accordance with the 
specific characteristics of the impairment and the idiosyncrasies of the markets 
targeted, as well as, more broadly on the financial structure of the economy and the 
set of tools available to the central bank. These measures encapsulate a broad range 
of transmission mechanism like the provision of liquidity to financial market 
participants outside the usual set of central bank counterparties, the provision of 
liquidity – or collateral – against securities not normally accepted for use in 
monetary policy operations and outright purchases of assets.  
The other unconventional tool is ―signaling‖ channel which provides substantial 
increments in investments through tiny changes in policy rates. This channel 
requires adjusting monetary policy instruments with the central banks’ targets 
effectively in order to ensure coordination. Furthermore, it implies shaping 
expectations about the expected future path of the policy rates. (Brainard, 2015) 
This channel is particularly essential in terms of forward guidance programs 
implemented by central banks. Through signaling central banks can mitigate 
uncertainties relating to realignments in policy rates. In this context, forward 
guidance policy should be mentioned as a wide approach inherent to central banks 
which confronted this problem. Generally, forward guidance implies managing 
market expectations of future policy with explicit communication on the central 
bank’s reaction function and economic projections. Monetary policy decisions can 
be influenced by both current and expected future policy settings. Therefore, 
formulating a signal tool to announce a future path of interest rates or any other 
policy measures could affect market expectations and increase policy effectiveness. 
Forward guidance is similar to conventional policy in that it provides information 
about short-term interest rates which affect broader interest rates that influence 
spending by consumers and businesses. However, forward guidance differs from 
conventional policy in that it carries a greater risk of being misinterpreted. 
(Woodford, 2012) Indeed approaches toward forward guidance rationality are also 
debatable.  In spite of the fact that forward guidance can also be applied in normal 
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conditions, it has widely used and contributed substantial positive results at the 
zero lower bound. (Yellen, 2012) According to various investigations in this field 
(Eggertsson & Ostry, 2005; Woodford, 2012), especially at the zero bound level, 
forward guidance is an effective tool which can be used to manage expectations of 
participants and their confidence to central banks’ policy commitments. On the 
other hand, some studies (Moessner & Nelson, 2008; Anderson & Hoffman, 2010) 
emphasize that the extent to which forward guidance improves central banks’ 
control over long-term interest rates is weak.  
The effectiveness of forward guidance depends on central banks’ reactions to 
market tensions and expectations. Assessment of forward guidance is very 
problematic because of difficulties of including all parameters which can influence 
formulation of policy rates. Therefore, forward guidance has several limitations. 
The primary limitation of forward guidance is that future policy rates are also 
limited by the zero lower bound during the financial crisis in most developed 
economies. Instead, many central banks have used other tools such as 
announcements about the future path of the policy rate (forward guidance), or 
quantitative easing measures involving a change in the size and the composition of 
the central bank balance sheet. (Del Negro et. al., 2015) With expected future rates 
so low, forward guidance has little room to stimulate the economy without 
stretching the horizon of forward guidance four or five years ahead. At the current 
zero bound policy rates period, forward guidance can also originate time-
inconsistency problem. This happens because of central banks’ efforts to convince 
the market and its participants that old policy rule will be avoided by allowing 
inflation (and output) to be higher in the recovery. On the other hand, within 
emergence of the recovery flickers, central banks prefer to go back on their pledge 
to keep rates low and raise interest rates in accordance with its old rule which leads 
to losing of confidence to central banks’ credibility in markets.  
  Furthermore, theoretically, asset purchases and forward guidance can fuel 
asset price booms over time by affecting directly prices of the purchased assets and 
indirectly prices of other assets via portfolio rebalancing. The degree of stimulus 
from forward guidance on future accommodative monetary policy depends on its 
impact on bond yields and other asset prices. Upon the normalization of monetary 
policy, at least some parts of the increments in asset prices will be reversed and 
contributed to potential negative implications for financial stability and growth in 
the adjustment period. The expansion of monetary stimulus has thus the potential 
to increase marginal costs, especially if very high valuations are already apparent.  
As shown in the Table 1, there are some concerns related to effectiveness and 
side-effects of these unconventional policy instruments. It is widely accepted issue 
that the objectives of MP-plus are to benefit not only the macro economy but also 
financial stability. (IMF, 2013b) MP-plus was considered as a tool package to 
mitigate short-term instability in financial markets and vulnerabilities in the 
domestic banking sector through enabling provision of liquidity to banks and 
buying specific assets. Taking in general, it can be said that implementation of 
these policies were successful in terms of ensuring advanced central banks to 
ensure their domestic goals, and were especially effective at the time of greatest 
financial turmoil. According to IMF, MP-plus also indirectly limits stress in the 
financial sector to the extent that it succeeds in preventing a sharper economic 
downturn. By encouraging economic activity through easing of credit conditions, 
MP-plus can help strengthen private and public balance sheets and thus make a 
more durable contribution to financial stability. 
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Table 1.Risks from MP-Plus and Mitigating Policies 
MP- Plus Policy Potential Risk Risk Assessment Mitigating Policies 
 
Prolonged 
periods of low 
interest rates 
Pressure on the profitability and 
solvency of financial institutions 
Low Robust capital requirements 
Excessive Risk Taking (search 
for yield) 
Low 
Vigilant risk-based 
supervision, robust capital 
requirements 
Ever greening, delay in balance 
sheet 
Medium 
Vigorous pursuit of balance 
sheet repair 
 
Quantitative 
easing 
Dependence on central bank 
financing 
Medium 
Improved liquidity risk 
management in banks, 
implementation of liquidity 
requirements, design of 
systemic liquidity risk 
mitigants 
Indirect credit 
easing 
Dependence on public sector 
financing 
Medium 
Improved liquidity risk 
management in banks, 
implementation of liquidity 
requirements, design of 
systemic liquidity risk 
mitigants 
Distortion of allocation of credit, 
possibly weakening underwriting 
standards 
Low 
Vigilant risk-based 
supervision, dynamic 
forward-looking provisioning, 
robust capital requirements 
Delay in balance sheet repair Medium 
Vigorous pursuit of balance 
sheet repair 
Reinforcement of bank–sovereign 
links 
Medium 
Vigorous pursuit of balance 
sheet repair, robust capital 
requirements 
Direct credit 
easing 
Distortion in prices and 
market functioning 
Low Address associated market risks in banks 
Source. IMF (2013a), Global Financial Stability Report: Old Risk, New Challenges 
 
The impact of unconventional monetary policies on the rest of the world is 
ambiguous. Although massively used by monetary authorities, these 
unconventional measures, in particular, the zero nominal bound on interest rate 
which was appreciated only a theoretical possibility prior to the crisis had been 
reached and zero-interest-rate policy had been implemented, growth remained 
anemic. In early periods of implementation- at the most intense period of the 
financial crisis, these measures which have strong market and macroeconomic 
impact,contributed to  buoyed asset prices globally, and likely benefited trade 
through bolstering confidence and providing financial markets with liquidity. But 
following this positive trend, their effects began to be much smaller together with 
triggering increments in capital flows to emerging markets. 
Among unconventional monetary policy tools, negative nominal policy rates 
can be assessed as the latest measure which began massively implement by 
monetary authorities. Cutting policy rates to ―zero lower bound‖ enables central 
banks to provide further stimulus if real interest rates are still above the levels 
consistent with price stability and full employment. When nominal rates become 
negative, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may also differ as there 
is non-linearity associated with the downward stickiness of retail deposit rates. 
Negative rates are used both in advanced and emerging economies with the 
purpose to encourage the private sector to spend more and support price stability 
by further easing monetary and financial conditions and also mitigate deflationary 
pressure on economy. Empiric investigations depict that in many in many 
economies – including Europe and the United States – real (inflation-adjusted) 
interest rates have been negative, sometimes as much as -2%. And yet, as real 
interest rates have fallen, business investment has stagnated.According to the 
OECD (2016), the percentage of GDP invested in a category that is mostly plant 
and equipment has fallen in both Europe and the US in recent years. (In the US, it 
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fell from 8.4% in 2000 to 6.8% in 2014; in the EU, it fell from 7.5% to 5.7% over 
the same period). One of the approaches toward implementation of zero or negative 
real interest rates is that their using as temporary tools undermines the efficient 
allocation of capital and set the stage for bubbles, busts, and crises. Furthermore, 
according to some scholars, massive implementation of  these measures contribute 
to further income concentration at the top by hurting small savers, while creating 
opportunities for large financial players to benefit from access to savings at 
negative real cost 
 
Table 2. Central Banks that Have Introduced Negative Policy Rates 
CountryCountry 
Date negative rate first 
introduced 
Latest policy rates, basic points (March 2016) 
 Lending rate Main policy rate Deposit rate 
Danish National Bank 
July 2012 to April 2014; 
September 2014 onwards 
5 0 -65 
ECB June 2014 onwards 25 0 -40 
Swiss National Bank December 2014 50 - -75 
Swedish Riksbank February 2015 25 -50 -125 
Bank of Japan January 2016 10 0 -10 
Hungarian National 
Bank 
March 2016 145 120 -5 
Source:  Viñals & Eckhold (2016) 
 
Incumbent widespread use of unconventional monetary policies is one of the 
debatable issues among scholars. Some of them consider that may be these 
measures had significant effects on lowering long-term interest rates; however their 
side-effects also imposed great hazards for ensuring monetary and financial 
stability. (Martin & Milas, 2012)
 
In particular, these policies contributed to 
ignoring asset and bond prices in shaping monetary policies. Two issues dealing 
with this problem ought to be mentioned: (i) violation of fiscal order; (ii) 
discrimination effects during acquisition and redistribution of assets. According to 
Meltzer (2010) and Taylor (2010), the real reason behind emerging such problems 
is massive implementation of quantitative easing.  
Realignments in monetary policy instruments and target involve very 
complicated issue in itself. However, it can be said sudden stopping of 
unconventional measures are also as much dangerous as using them massively. 
Firstly, calibrating monetary policy stance or lowering liquidity assets or increasing 
policy rates on zero bound level is very arduous. Secondly, proper forecasting 
reactions of markets to sudden changes in monetary policies are also seen very 
unrealistic. For instance, asset selling by central banks can be understood as signal 
for stock traders. If central banks begin to reduce speed of this process, under the 
pressure of fiscal authorities, this can result with sharp changes in inflation 
expectations which in its turn can lead to further surges in long-term interest rates. 
It should also be noticed that extreme low interest rates are accompanied by high 
risk premiums, which can contribute to deviations in the process of eliminating 
troubles relating to restructuring of balance of payments and financial system. The 
investigations in this field depict that there is strong interrelation between 
indicators characterizing risk levels in financial markets and monetary policy 
decisions. 
On the other hand, undesirable side effects of unconventional monetary policy 
tools are also appreciated as significant risks for the realization of central banks’ 
targets in middle and long run. The experience of the countries in which these 
measures are used widely, provision of ample bank liquidity contribute to 
emergence of credit risks at banks by compromising underwriting and loan quality 
standards, and it may encourage a delay in necessary balance sheet repair and bank 
restructuring. In macro level, as known from economic theory, lowering interest 
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rates encourage other financial institutions, like pension funds, insurance 
companies, and money market mutual funds, to increase risk by ―searching for 
yield‖. Furthermore, lower interest rates are also key factors which can contribute 
to massive lending to borrowers (borrowers with a bad credit history for example 
that due to an improvement in their net worth are not so risky anymore) that were 
deemed in the past to be too risky (Bernanke et. al., 1996) or the ones with fewer 
pledgeable assets. (Matsuyama, 2007) Moreover, presence of lower interest rates 
may lead to reducing the threat of deposit withdrawals, abating adverse selection 
problems in credit markets through allowing banks to relax their lending standards 
and to increase their credit risk-taking. (Jiménez et. al., 2008) This situation in 
markets makes it available for low levels of short-term interest rates to lead 
financial institutions to a search-for-yield through transforming riskless assets less 
alluring. (Rajan, 2006) 
In the framework of poor risk-based prudential supervision and capital 
requirements, this ―searching‖ push the market value of some assets beyond their 
fundamental value (―bubbles‖) or drive an excessive increase in balance sheet 
leverage. This situation is stringently similar to the phenomenon calling 
―Greenspan put‖ which involves the monetary policy conducted by Fed aiming to 
provide liquidity in financial markets prior to the crisis. (Bekaert, 2013) However 
this policy contributed to appearing of asset ―bubbles‖ in markets and made 
policymakers take into consideration potential risks for financial markets stemming 
from expansionist monetary policies. 
One of the side- effects of unconventional policies is sudden stops or exiting 
these measures. More than 5 years, central banks are continuing accommodative 
policies which have contributed to swelling of their balance sheets. Within massive 
implementation of unconventional monetary policy tools, monetary authorities 
have begun to use actively their balance sheets in order to mitigate pressures on 
markets and create a shunting area for financial intermediates, also enhancing 
effectiveness of transmission of accommodative policies on the markets. The 
urgent needs make central banks to use balance sheets in this process can be listed 
as below (ECB, 2015): 
The need to respond to financial stress and manage financial crises – in line 
with central banks’ traditional function as the ultimate provider of funding 
reassurance for the banking system; The need to enable or improve the 
transmission of the intended monetary policy stance in the presence of market 
impairments; The need to provide additional monetary accommodation – that is, to 
further ease the stance – by exerting downward pressure on long-term interest rates 
when short-term nominal policy rates have been reduced to their effective lower 
bound.  
In order to realize these, central banks choose provision of massive amounts of 
domestic and foreign exchange liquidity to prevent stress in key markets from 
hitting the real economy as an efficient way. The lower bound constraint on 
monetary policy interest rates forced several major central banks to switch to 
purchases of long-term public bonds and even foreign exchange to further ease 
their policy stance. With the purpose to reduce impact of financial stresses on the 
real economy, in particular, the vulnerabilities which active liquidity provision to 
funding and credit markets can create, central banks formulated specific policies 
used to support financial stability broadly warrant inclusion for use to counter 
systemic financial stress. 
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Table 3. Unconventional Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies 
Objective Policy Inclusion in the toolkit 
Financial 
stability 
Liquidity provision to 
funding and credit 
markets 
Appropriate when liquidity stress spilling over into 
real economy but with safeguards and coordination 
Foreign exchange 
liquidity provision to 
local markets 
Appropriate when foreign exchange liquidity stress 
spilling over into real economy but with safeguards 
and coordination 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Bond purchases 
Effective for highly credible central banks to a 
degree when the policy rate is at the lower bound 
but there are risks and policy overlaps 
Large-scale foreign 
exchange intervention 
Effective for highly credible central banks in 
stemming appreciation in the short-run but also 
poses important policy, balance sheet, and 
multilateral risks 
Credit provision to the 
private sector 
Weak case to be done by the central bank vis-à-vis 
the government in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances 
Source: Stone, Fujita, & Ishi, (2011). 
 
On the other hand, within evolving unconventional measures and growing 
financial imbalances, it became obvious that expanded balance sheets can 
contribute to increasing risks like markets or portfolio risks (through purchases of 
long-term debt), credit and exchange rate risks. Large balance sheets are potential 
sources for emerging portfolio risk, partly in the form of high leverage. The 
balance sheets of major central banks have expanded from around $5-6 trillion 
prior to 2007/2008 to over $18 trillion. In many developed countries in which QE 
policies are actively used on base of zero bound levels, central bank assets 
constitute between 20% and 30% of GDP. 
               
 
 
Graph 2. Balance Sheets of Advanced Central Banks 
Source: Bloomberg, RBA & Thomson Reuters 
Note: Based on central bank communicated intentions assuming constant exchange rates 
 
Active using of balance sheets requires central banks to act in a broad array of 
financial markets in order to substitute their own balance sheet for that of private 
intermediaries. In the period of the most severe recession, this active participation 
is accepted as a sound signal to mitigate dysfunction and inertness in of the 
markets. Within expanding gradual normalization process in monetary policies, 
however, this dominant role can contribute much more devastating outcomes 
through cardinally changing market conditions. Firstly, central banks with 
excessive balance sheets are subjected to interest rate risks. Sudden or more-rapid-
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than-expected rise in interest rates, especially longer-term interest rates will be 
accepted as central banks’ intentions to dissolve their profuse portfolios. This 
preconception which is formed under the expectations of future declines in bond 
prices, in its turn, will lead to the increasing of speculations and chaos in the 
markets. The efforts by central banks to shrink their balance sheets are also risk-
originated sources which can disrupt markets, particularly, if market vulnerabilities 
are not completely solved. Uncertainty about the necessity or willingness of central 
banks to sell their large portfolios of government bonds and other assets could lead 
financial markets to overreact when central banks begin to sell these assets. Fears 
that central bank sales could lead to falling bond prices may prompt private 
investors to dump bonds, which could lead to the previously mentioned sharp 
increases in interest rates (Oppers, 2013). 
All these indicate that it is very complicated and debatable issue to exit 
accommodative policies in the context of long lasted implementation of 
unconventional measures and fragile and unsustainable recovery challenges in 
global economy. Lack of appropriate and timely policy measures can highlight 
adverse results of exit from unconventional measures. Active participation by 
central banks in markets can lead to deterioration of market functioning or missing 
major vulnerabilities rather than mitigating instability or lack of confidence. 
Contemporary policies following by major central banks are mainly related to this 
issue. Presence of highly destructive downturns in markets, financial and 
macroeconomic instabilities in major advanced and emerging economies, 
transitional processes in global economy make central banks to exit and reduce 
unconventional measures gradually. According to IMF estimations, if U.S. growth 
rate would be 1% lower than expectations, this would contribute to 0.2% decrease 
in global output (approximately same results are relevant to Eurozone). (IMF, 
2013c)
 
Moreover, estimations depict that financial system shocks which erupted 
after leaving unconventional policy tools, can originate much more detrimental 
impact on economic activity by increasing risk premiums to the level observed in 
the crisis. For instance, such shocks in U.S. can be accompanied by 1.7-1.9% 
reduction in global output while the level of decrement is estimated nearly 0.5-
0.7% if they are observed in EU. On the other hand, exiting UMP can be 
synchronically observed together with central banks’ stopping in buying T-bonds. 
In the economies in which fiscal consolidation and large budget deficits exist, 
giving up UMP would result substantial increments in taxation. In this case, 1% 
point rise in taxes/GDP share in the U.S. would lead to restrict global GDP growth 
0.6-0.8%. Applying this estimation to Eurozone, it can be observed that 1% point 
rise in taxes/GDP share would diminish global output growth 0.2-0.3%. In the 
context of continuing but at an increasingly disappointing pace of global growth, 
supporting and guarding it against downside risks constitute priority for 
policymakers in all levels. The new World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2016) 
anticipates a slight acceleration in growth in 2016 relative to 2015, to a 3.2% rate 
of growth, followed by a further acceleration to 3.5% in 2017. However, these 
projections continue to be progressively less optimistic over time. The reasons 
lying under this trend require multi-pronged policy approach on monetary, fiscal 
and structural policies. Therefore existing strategies from UMP should be 
formulated based on factors affecting global growth patterns substantially like 
growing inequality, structural reforms, China's growth model transformation and 
its impact on other economies and etc. The experience of exiting accommodative 
monetary policies shows that it would be much easier to mitigate their effects if 
countries can achieve to formulate foreign currency reserve buffers, to use 
exchange rates as shock absorbers. It should be paralleled with effective monetary-
fiscal policy coordination both in macro and international levels. 
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4. Classic Dilemma in front of Central Banks: Monetary or 
Financial Stability? 
Financial crisis in 2007-2008 and its long lasting impacts resulted with changes 
in macroeconomic policy framework. Prior to the crisis, there was a common 
anxiety relating to potential deleterious impact of financial disruptions on the 
economy, particularly, in the phase of outstanding global economic growth 
patterns. The financial crisis and Great Recession have prompted a rethink of 
monetary policy and central banking through verification of monetary policy 
frameworks focused primarily on maintaining price stability, as price stability has 
proven not to be a sufficient condition for financial stability and lack of financial 
stability can have large negative feedback effects on price stability. The crisis also 
revealed that safety and soundness of individual financial institutions could not 
ensure stability of whole financial system. The experience of the crisis makes it 
necessity to revise both macro and micro-prudential policies in order to ensure 
financial stability by increasing the resilience of the financial sector and reducing 
its pro-cyclicality.  
On the other hand, the crisis indicated that ensuring stability of inflation and 
output cannot be accepted enough in terms of guarantying macroeconomic 
stability. Therefore adjusting interest rate policies with financial conditions are 
very essential. Severity of the recession and inadequacy of the policies made it 
obvious that international capital swings also impose high level of volatility. These 
volatilities are very destructive particularly for the open economies which possess 
underdeveloped financial markets, high levels of reserve accumulations and 
undiversified economic systems. The impact of capital flows can be direct (through 
current account balance and aggregate demand) and indirect (through current 
balance to financial stability). If local currency begins to appreciate with the help 
of flows, the financial sector can lose its competitiveness. From its initial stage, the 
crisis depicted that framework of classic multiple-equilibrium which encapsulated 
insuring bank deposits and provision them with ―lender of last resort‖ had begun to 
be applied wholesale funding and non-bank intermediaries. The debt crisis in the 
EU made it obvious that this tendency was also characteristics for sovereigns. 
Governments whose revenues are consisted of future tax collections are exposure 
to liquidity problems much more than financial intermediaries. Therefore central 
banks’ duty to ensure liquidity not only for banks and non-deposit-taking 
institutions but state budget has become actual problem. Furthermore, general 
equilibrium modeling frameworks used at central banks until the crisis did not 
incorporate financial frictions as a major source of business cycle fluctuations. This 
led to a dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy in which 
these two types of policies are conducted separately.  
The crisis proved the importance of financial factors in the process of 
identifying macroeconomic fluctuations. The consensus prior to the crisis dictated 
that central banks do not need to take into consideration the effects of financial 
variables on inflation. However, the analysis based on DSGE model indicates that 
central banks’ implemented pro-cyclical policies relied on standard Taylor rule 
which led to increments in business cycle volatilities. (Gambacorta & Signoretti, 
2013) After the crisis, monetary authorities’ approach has become much 
accommodative and counter-cyclical in the framework of ―leaning against the 
wind‖ policies intending to minimize impacts of financial frictions. Research on 
various policy tools reflect that central banks’ reactions to financial variables help 
them to get a suitable stance between inflation and output, particularly when credit 
supply has a significant impact on real economy. Maintaining financial stability 
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can help to ensure a well-working financial system and an effective transmission 
process which makes achieving price stability more efficient. 
 Generally, it is accepted that monetary policy can bolster financial stability 
using various transmission channels. It is widely known that monetary policy 
affects the general level of prices, at least in the long run, and that it may influence 
output only transitorily. The final target of monetary policy- price stability 
generates certainty about the real level of debt, and stable economic growth helps 
companies to service debt and maintain healthy balance sheets. However, empirical 
researches depict that financial imbalances have become much devastating in the 
context of limited effectiveness of monetary policy through redirecting its setting 
from what it needs to maintain price stability in the medium term. Monetary policy 
seems neither the most effective nor the most efficient tool to use if the aim is to 
safeguard financial stability. 
 
 
Graph 3. Relation between Monetary Policy and Financial Stability 
Source. Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, № 33, June 2013. 
 
As seen in the Graph 3, the relation between monetary policy and financial 
stability is highly multi-correlated. Central banks’ considerations toward asset 
bubbles are also crucial issues in terms of appreciating transmission channel of 
monetary policy decisions to financial stability. Indeed, there are controversial 
empirical results regarding with efficiency of regulation asset bubbles by monetary 
policy tools. The theory of optimal monetary policy requires that monetary policy 
responds to asset prices in order to obtain good outcomes in terms of inflation and 
output. Hence, the issue of how monetary policy might respond to asset-price 
movements: whether it should not respond at all (leaning against asset price 
bubbles) or it should respond over and above the response (cleaning up after the 
bubble bursts) is called for in terms of objectives to stabilize inflation and 
employment. (Borio & Lowe, 2002) Prior to the crisis, the predominant view had 
been that speculative bubbles could not be identified in real time so that the only 
solution was to adopt measures to diminish the negative effects of such bubbles 
after their burst, although it was clear that such an approach encourages moral 
hazard and excessive exposure to risk. (OECD, 2011) However, some economists 
(Cecchetti et. al., 2000; Borio & Lowe, 2002; White, 2004)
 
considered that the best 
way to struggle against bubbles and their negative outcomes would be raising by 
raising interest rates in the light of ―lean against the wind‖ concept. Fed former 
chairman Bernanke and others (Bernanke & Gertler, 2001; Gilchrist & Leahy, 
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2002) argued that monetary policy bubbles would not have tremendous effects in 
asset markets to eliminate ―bubbles‖. Based on the experience of last crisis, it 
becomes obvious that interest rate increments can lead to negative effects not only 
in financial markets, but also in macroeconomic context. According to Greenspan 
(2002), asset bubbles are capable to affect inflation and employment in direct or 
indirect ways which makes it much more appropriate for monetary policy to clean 
up bubbles after they burst rather than leaning against them. His arguments can be 
listed as below: 
Detecting a bubble is really hard in terms of identifying it while it is in progress; 
Because of market participants’ high returns expectations from bubble-driven 
assets,  interest rate increments is not adequate method against them; It is ought to 
be taken into account that monetary policy actions are a very blunt instrument in 
detecting all bubbles through affecting the asset prices in general, rather than solely 
those in a bubble; Theoretical models indicate that raising interest rates with the 
purpose to mitigate possible hazards of rising asset prices can result with much 
more damage for economies than acceleration of bubbles. 
Analyzing prior-to crisis period indicate that financial distress can be result of 
loose or benign economic conditions. The phenomenon called asset bubbles indeed 
appears as a result of fluctuations in various economic drivers like demand, 
financial sector and credit channels. For instance, loosen monetary policy trigger 
households and firms to increase consumption and investment spending, some of 
which may be financed by credit. In the period of low and stable inflation, 
favorable supply-side developments and easier access to external finance anchor 
expectations dealing with price stability. These optimistic assessments of risk lead 
to unsustainable expansion of aggregate demand by inducing greater stickiness in 
price and wages. Monetary policy can also affect aggregate demand through 
exchange rates variations which in its turn would contribute to appearing of 
financial stability problems by creating imbalances in relative prices of domestic 
and foreign goods and services. Furthermore, two main components of affecting 
asset bubbles are the impact on net interest margins and the impact on credit risk 
and asset write-offs which tempt financial institutions to refrain from loans to 
borrowers in distress.  
Effects on monetary policy stance on risk perceptions or risk tolerance are one 
of the transmission channels lead to emerging bubbles. The effects of loose 
monetary policy which mainly contributed to excessive risk taking in financial 
markets have become one of the rekindling issues within the last crisis. Monetary 
policy can affect strongly risk aversion and uncertainty which are key variables 
influencing business cycles. Investigations (Adrian & Shin, 2008) indicate that lax 
monetary policy induces excess leverage as in perhaps monetary policy is potent 
enough to weed out financial excess. Conversely, in times of crisis and heightened 
risk aversion, monetary policy can influence risk aversion and uncertainty in the 
market place, and therefore affect real outcomes. This situation can avoid monetary 
policy from its primary goal- preserving price stability through trying to smooth 
fluctuations in financial sector which indeed would dampen market signals and 
increase risk aversion. 
The way to preserve financial stability is still complicated, in particular in the 
context of revising monetary authorities’ stance and mandates. The investigations 
and challenges of post-crisis indicate that central banks should be responsible to 
conduct macro-prudential policies in order to achieve financial stability. Within 
erupting of the crisis, it becomes obvious that dividing financial stability 
responsibilities between central banks and financial regulatory authorities has led 
problems in linking policies in these fields and also in the institutional management 
field. (Kawai & Morgan, 2012) Generally, the introduction of macro-prudential 
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policies can improve the trade-offs for monetary policy and increase its room for 
maneuvers. Macro-prudential policies can by managing the financial cycle and 
increasing the resilience of the financial sector reduce the probability of systemic 
stress trade-offs that may arise when exiting accommodative monetary policies. 
(Smets, 2013) This requires solid and well-designed coordination mechanism 
between macro-prudential and monetary policies. This is especially important to 
reduce negative impacts of macro-prudential policies on the effectiveness of 
monetary policies. In the absence of compensating each other’s deficiencies, 
consolidation of responsibilities for charging both policies can be assessed 
adequate in the current stage. This consolidation requires clarifying both 
institutional and policy-setting responsibilities. 
 
Table 4. The Relation between Monetary and Macro-Prudential Policies in Various Views 
 Modified Jackson Hole consensus 
Leaning against the wind 
vindicated 
Financial stability is 
price stability 
Monetary Policy 
Framework largely unchanged; 
Limited effects on credit and risk 
taking; 
Blunt instrument to deal with 
imbalances 
Financial stability as secondary 
objective: lengthening of horizon; 
Affects risk-taking; 
―Gets in all of the cracks‖ 
Twin objectives on 
equal footing; 
Unblocks balance 
sheet impairments; 
avoids financial 
imbalances in 
upturns 
Macro prudential Granular and effective 
Cannot fully address financial 
cycle; arbitrage 
Indistinguishable 
from monetary 
policy 
Interaction 
Limited interaction and easy 
separation of objectives, 
instruments, … 
Financial fragility affects monetary 
transmission are price stability 
Financial stability and price 
stability are intimately interlinked 
Financial stability 
and price stability 
are intimately 
interlinked 
Source: Smets (2013). 
 
Modified Jackson Hole approach implies that, monetary authorities should keep 
their mandate in preserving price stability while macro-prudential authorities have 
to be charged in financial stability.  According to this approach, the relation 
between macro-prudential and monetary policies and their transmission 
mechanisms differ substantially and this relation is restricted. However, according 
to ―Leaning against the wind‖ conception, financial stability should not be primary 
target of monetary policy. This view argues that the narrow focus of many central 
banks on the inflation outlook over the relatively short term of two to three years 
prevented them from leaning more aggressively against growing financial 
imbalances.  The third approach shows that there is an urgent need to realign in the 
targets of monetary policy. This view implies that they are so closely related that 
both standard and non-standard monetary policies are in the first place attempts at 
stabilizing the financial system, addressing malfunctioning financial markets and 
unclogging the monetary transmission process. 
As shown in these approaches, the need for coordination between monetary 
policy and financial stability is unambiguous. In spite of the possibility of conflicts 
between these policies in the short-term, this coordination should be achieved in 
medium and long terms in order to ensure sustainable macroeconomic stability. 
Central banks do not need to target asset prices directly; however, they should 
originate preventive measures against the possibility of appearing systemic risks 
deriving from credit cycles. The degree of the relation among these policies ought 
to depend on their impact of economic cycles and financial markets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and with a focus on 
macroeconomic imbalances in the world, the ways central banks and generally, 
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monetary policies operating have become crucial issues for economic 
investigations. Mandates of central banks and their stance in provision of financial 
and policy stability require substantial realignments in the context of challenges of 
the post-crisis conjecture. 
In the light of contradictious approaches to the central banks’ policy tools and 
current mandates in preserving macroeconomic stability, the policies used by 
central banks to cope with imbalances are debatable issues in terms of effectiveness 
and purposefulness. The experience shows that unconventional monetary policies 
can be effective at overcoming the limitations on policy at the zero lower bound by 
operating through channels broadly similar to conventional monetary policy. 
However, relying on these measures, in the medium and long term can be resulted 
with future imbalances. Weak banking sector, debt overhang problems in the 
household and government sectors, as well as greater macroeconomic and policy 
uncertainty are the factors dampening efficiency of these measures. Bond 
purchases, massively used, particularly by advanced central banks seem to exhibit 
diminishing effectiveness, and their growing scale raises risks. Some evidence also 
suggests that these policies encouraged growth and prevented deflation, although 
this conclusion is less clear-cut, given the long lags and unstable relationships 
between variables, and the unresolved question of what would have happened 
without central bank policy intervention. Exceptionally accommodative and 
prolonged monetary easing can be counterproductive, as it can delay the necessary 
restructuring of balance sheets and, in the longer run, undermine the credibility of 
central banks (Bech et. al. 2012). Restricted by the lower bound, central banks 
cannot fully realize their target of preserving macroeconomic stability using 
balance sheet policies. Enhanced liquidity provision, relaxation of collateral rules, 
and sizable asset purchases have led to increases in the absolute size of central 
bank balance sheets, together with leading to risks like (i) implicit or explicit 
valuation losses as a result of a rise in interest rates; (ii) declines in operating 
income when central banks increase their holdings of long-dated securities with 
low coupon interest rates; (iii) possible impairment losses on assets with credit risk 
and etc. 
Furthermore, continuation of monetary easing can lead to various forms as (i) 
excessive risk taking and emerging of new asset bubbles which threaten financial 
stability; (ii) shaping of inflation expectations in a wrong way through damaging 
central banks’ targeting and policy efficiency in this field; (iii) making it much 
more problematic for central banks to switch to normalization in monetary policies 
(taking into account that such prolonged period of low rates make it compulsory 
fulfill substantial adjustments and financial institutions) and other issues relating to 
provision of liquidity, realizing macro-prudential regulation and etc. 
It is undeniable truth which extracted from recent economic imbalances that 
monetary authorities cannot manage the economy with just interest rate and an 
inflation target. As central banks move away from the simplicity and well-
rehearsed routine of interest rate policy, they face much trickier calibration and 
communication issues. This is especially crucial in the sphere of maintaining 
financial stability and surveillance of markets. The outcome derived from various 
investigations implies that monetary authorities should include financial stability 
among their targets in achieving macroeconomic resilience. They can regulate and 
influence financial stability in various ways including actively participating in the 
markets or only using indirect transmission mechanism depending on economic 
situation. The correlation between monetary policy and financial stability, the 
stance and policy toolkit of central banks’ in this field should not be assessed in a 
limited hypothesis and variable databases as in the most pre-crisis models and 
suggestions. Because of scope of the article, issues relating to banking sector and is 
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impact on preserving financial stability are not analyzed in depth. However, it is 
obvious that central banks are not able to attain financial stability if banking sector 
exhibit weakness against economic stagnations and do not reduce their 
involvement in speculation and financial gambling. 
Consequently, the global financial crisis has contributed to emerging millennial 
realignments in overall economic policy making, in particular, because of its 
nature, in monetary policy. In spite of lots of conventional and unconventional 
tools have been introduced by monetary authorities to mitigate adverse 
consequences of imbalances, these policies have always been criticized because of 
their unforeseen and unwelcome consequences. For these reasons, formulating new 
frameworks for monetary policy, enhancing effectiveness of its transmission 
mechanisms and most notably, providing monetary authorities with sufficient tools 
are the substantial and urgent challenges in the post-crisis fragile recovery stage. 
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